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BOOK REVIEW
ON THE USES OF ECONOMICS: A REVIEW OF THE
ANTITRUST TREATISES
ANTITRUST LAW. By Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner,
Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1978. Vol. I, pp. xvii,
391; Vol. II, pp. xviii, 431; Vol. III, pp. xx, 390. Price per
volume $45.00.
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST. By Lawrence
Anthony Sullivan, St. Paul, Minn.; West Publishing Co., 1977.
Pp. xxviii, 886. Price $16.95.
Louis B. ScHwARTz t
When Judge Herbert Goodrich, former dean of the University
of Pennsylvania Law School, was Director of the American Law
Institute in the late 1950s, he asked me whether the Institute should
embark upon a Restatement of Antitrust Law or a Model Antitrust
Law. I responded with an unhesitating negative. The subject was
political, I said, and the recommendations of the Institute would
reflect largely the biases of the reportorial staff, and even more certainly the inherent conservatism of the elite of the bench and bar.
The Institute would do as well to embark upon a Restatement of
Constitutional Law or Due Process. The antitrust laws have a constitutional scope and import,' and as in constitutional interpretatation it is of the essence that interpretation be evolutionary, foregoing any attempt at absolute and final divination of the legislative
goals of the draftsmen.
My counsel to the Director of the Institute was given in the
light of my then-recent experience with President Eisenhower's
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws. 2 There, an elite group of antitrust lawyers, the overwhelming majority of whom represented "Big Business," was able to make
f Benjamin Franklin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
J.D. 1935, University of Pennsylvania.

-See

B.S. 1932,

Schwartz, American Antitrust Laws and Free Enterprise, 2 Swiss REv.

INT'L ANTITUST L. 3, 3-5 (1978).

2 See The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
(1955)

and my dissent, quoted in part at id. 390-93, and reproduced in full at

1 ANTUST BuLL. 37 (1955).
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thirty-five proposals to soften the antitrust laws 3 without even embarking on an empirical investigation into the impact on public
welfare of the laws as they stood. I do not for a moment suggest
that these positions were explicitly client-directed or unpatriotically
disregarding of the public interest. One who has experienced antitrust administration as a constant threat, annoyance, or obstruction
need not be insincere or stupid to identify the public interest with
reduction of this irritating set of governmental constraints on entrepreneurial freedom.
I am, however, now uneasy about the counsel I gave against
ALI intervention in the passionate political controversy over antitrust. Foreign relations and tort law are certainly not less controversial or political, and the Institute has not disgraced itself in those
fields. 4 Moreover, someone was bound to come along and restate
antitrust law with, inevitably, his own biases, his own economic
myths, his own political faith. Three eminent scholars have in fact
addressed the task. Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner
of Harvard Law School offer a massive treatise entitled Antitrust
Law-An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application.5
Three volumes are already in print, three more in prospect. The
first two volumes take us through Part One, Preliminary and
Pervasive Issues: Antitrust Goals, Coverage, Procedure, and Economics. Volume III carries us halfway through Part Two, Market
Structure Issues, a topic to be completed in Volume IV. Part Three,
Restraints of Trade: Horizontal and Vertical, will be the subject of
Volumes V and VI. Professor Lawrence A. Sullivan of the University of California School of Law, Berkeley, meanwhile offers a
notable monograph in West Publishing Company's Hornbook Series,
calling it Handbook of the Law of Antitrust.6 The two works
invite comparison. It is enough to say preliminarily that Areeda
and Turner have produced something close to what the American
Law Institute would have sponsored: a comprehensive, powerfully
analytical antitrust compendium in the cautious midstream of opinion. The eccentricities of "Chicago School" economics on the
right are avoided.7 The "populism" of the left is abjured. Sullivan
3 The Attorney Genera's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws

(1955).
4See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED

STATES (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
5 P. AnEEDA & D. TURNER, ANTrrnusT LAw (1978).
6 L. SUlTvAN, HANDBOOK OF T=E LAw OF ANnr~ausT (1977).

7But Areeda and Turner might be embarrassed by Richard Posner's assertion
that their views converge with his own. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 933-44 (1979).
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has given us the book I should like to have written, combining
admirable technical analysis and precision with a broad humanism,
imagination, wit, skepticism, and literary grace.
I shall have some harsh things to say about the Areeda and
Turner treatise as a guide to antitrust policy. It is therefore important to stress its many admirable qualities and features. In the
tradition of classic encyclopedias like Wigmore's and Williston's,
it is both a monument and an indispensable guide. Its magisterial
pronouncements will, for a generation, be the starting point of
research by practitioners, judges, and students of law and industrial
organization. One can only hope that policymakers, including
judges, will not be overwhelmed by its manifest authority and make
Areeda and Turner the terminal point as well. The authors'
pedagogical experience and orderly minds show themselves in the
luminous introductions to each new problem; in the careful unraveling of every thread of the skein; in the revealing captions on
nearly every paragraph; in the rigorous pursuit of each idea until
it is pinned down, shorn of excrescences, included in the canon or
placed in the Index; in the crisp briefs of leading cases; in the frequent, lucid summaries in which conclusions are tidily recapitulated;
and in the excellent, detailed table of contents and index.8
I. POPULISM

The key to Areeda's and Turner's approach to antitrust issues,
intellectually, is an obsession with "populism." Juxtaposing it to
"economics," "efficiency," and optimum allocation of resources, they
present populism as a crude, confused yearning for income equalization, dispersion of economic and political power, and "atomization"
of industry, and an aspiration for the virtues of yeomanry. According to Areeda and Turner, "populist goals should be given little or
no independent weight in formulating antitrust rules and presumptions." 9 The errors of populism are attacked with theological
fervor that is at times self-caricaturing, as when "populists" are
chastised for the "peculiar and perverse" rejection of
8 Sullivan's Handbook is, in contrast, very poorly indexed.

Important subjects,

carrying captions in the text, fail to appear in the index. For example, Chapter 9,
Part B, Section 238, Governmental Action and Its Solicitation, finds no analogue
in the index; there are no entries under Government Action, State Action, NoerrPennington, or even Defenses.

In the case of Section 244c of the same chapter,

Collateral Effects, there are no index entries under Collateral Estoppel, Estoppel, or
Res Judicata. Other missing headings are Civil Actions (cf. Ch. 9, Pt. B, §244,
Civil Actions), Procedure, Trial, Remedies, and Equitable Relief. Some relevant
references do appear, however, under other headings. L. SuLLrvA,
supra note 6.
9 1 P. AnEEDA & D. TusuERa, supra note 5, If 105, at 13.
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the right to develop and practice new and more efficient
methods of doing business or to provide consumers with
better products and services. Those who have espoused
the primacy of [populist] goals have either indulged in
euphemism, mistakenly assumed that one man's entrepreneurial initiative would rarely if ever limit the options
of others, or simply failed to think their concepts through. 10
One would be hard put to find protagonists of the perverse
"primacy" that the authors so mercilessly expose, or indeed any
critics of Areeda's and Turner's policy stance who march under the
banner of populism. "Populism" becomes, therefore, merely an
epithet, a stick to beat people and ideas, useful against "fellow
travelers" as well as against heterodox sectaries. It is sad that
'"populism" can be so used, but this reviewer sees hope and portent
in the history of populism's tenets which have become today's
orthodoxies: antitrust laws, railroad regulation, regulation of stock
and commodities markets, wage-hour legislation, protection of collective bargaining, child labor laws, and taxation of income at progressive rates."
A. The Confusion of Learned Hand
Among the misguided ones who, according to Areeda and
Turner, have "failed to think their concepts through" is Learned
Hand. (L. Hand a populistl?) They focus on Judge Hand's famous
observations in the Alcoa case: 12 "We have been speaking only of
the economic reasons which forbid monoply; but, as we have already
implied, there are others, based upon the belief that great industrial
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results."'13 Such views are scornfully dismissed as "casual,
gratuitous, or unsupported," 14 a "confusion" 15 (perhaps on the part
of the readers of Hand), the baneful consequences of which are
then traced through subsequent merger decisions of the Supreme
Court. The authors here ignore an important maxim of prudence:
when you shoot at a king you must kill him. Hand comes away
The authors argue that he
from the encounter unscathed.
'Id.

"See

f1110, at 24.

0.

PLUNGERS, AND

CLANToN, KANSAS POPUliSm 232 (1969);

hossIVEs (1965).

C. CowING, PoPuLSs,

12 United States v. Alum. Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Is Id. 428, quoted in 1 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNm, supra note 5, 1[104, at 10.
14 1 P. AmDA & D. TuaRmn, supra note 5, ff 104, at 9.
15 Id. 1f104, at 11.
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could not have meant what he plainly said because he was talking
"only of the case in which multiple units 'can effectively compete
with each other.' "16 Multiple units could not so compete, they
argue, if one firm enjoyed scale economies that enabled it to undercut higher-cost firms and win all the business without improper
conduct. The authors to the contrary, Hand was not talking "only"
of "a case" in which multiple units can effectively compete. Clearly
Hand was identifying the kind of industrial organization which
Congress had decided to prefer as most likely to realize the economic
and political gains of competition. He certainly was not calling
upon courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular industry could be conducted "more efficiently" in a competitive or concentrated setting. "Efficiency," moreover, is a far more
ambiguous concept than is implied by its pervasive use in the
7
Areeda and Turner treatise.1
As to whether Hand meant what he said about noneconomic
values in antitrust law, one has only to look at the rest of his opinion to see that he unequivocally did mean it. He talks elsewhere
of "wider purposes," meaning wider than economic purposes. :8
He rejects any distinction between "good" and "bad" monopolies,
because Congress "forbad all." '9 His exception for a monopolist
who survives a competitive contest "merely" because of "superior
skill, foresight and industry," 20 was not coupled, as Areeda and
Turner would have it, with a justification of monopoly on the
basis of "economies of scale." 21 The Hand exculpation involves
behavior, not structure. Sensitive to the criminal provisions of the
Sherman Act, Hand sought only to exculpate the firm competing
16 Id. ff 104, at 10.

17See L. ScmwMlrz & J. FLYNN,

ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNAIVES

(1977):
Consider the criticism of decision-making during the Vietnam War where
American "efficiency" was measured in terms of "body counts," number of
"pacified" villages and tons of bombs dropped:
The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is
okay as far as it goes. The second step is to disregard that which
can't be measured or give it an arbitrary quantitative value. This is
artificial and misleading. The third step is to presume that what
can't be measured easily really isn't very important. This is blindness.
The fourth step is to say that what can't be easily measured really
doesn't exist This is suicide. [Quoted in A. Smith, The Last Days of
Cowboy Capitalism, THE AT.Anc MoNTHLY, Sept. 1972, at 43.]
18 United States v. Alum. Co., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
19 Id.
20 Id. 430.
21 1 P. AREEDA & D. Tuar'wma, supra note 5, f 104, at 9-10.
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aggressively but honestly in the race, outlawing only actions pur22
posely designed to prevent or "fix" the race.
The authors note, as a clincher in their demonstration of
Hand's "confusion," a conflict between his declaration, on the one
hand, that courts are incapable of continuous supervision to establish that the "good" or efficient monopolists "had exercised the
highest possible ingenuity, had adopted every possible economy, had
anticipated every conceivable improvement," 23 and, on the other
hand, his willingness to commit the courts to a program of "preserv[ing] small inefficient competitors against the inroads of more
efficient rivals." 2 No such self-contradiction appears in Hand's
opinion. As noted above, he calls neither for preservation of the
inefficient nor for case-by-case judicial appraisal of the impact on
efficiency of a concentrated industry as compared to a hypothetically
deconcentrated one. It was enough for Hand that Congress had
manifested its preference for a deconcentrated system. One may
note without further comment the authors' unproved assumptions
that the "small" are always or usually less efficient than monopolists
and their substitution of "preserving inefficiency" for the real issue
of preventing monopoly. Turner has not always been so intransigently opposed to Hand's famous declaration or to non-efficiency
values in antitrust.25
B. Economic Efficiency and "Populist" Values
The authors are far too careful as scholars and clever as polemicists to be caught out on a political limb like anti-populism.
On the contrary, they are able, having slaughtered populism, to
ingest it: "[G]ompetitive policy also promotes populist goals that are
commonly thought important"; 28 economic objectives are only
"generally" paramount; 27 economic efficiency is not the sole objective of public policy, but statutes other than the antitrust laws may
be relied on to set the parameters within which antitrust laws
may operate.2 8 In their moments of moderation, it seems that only
22
Cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 n.7 (1966) ("monopoly
power... consciously acquired," by preemptive tactics).
23
United States v. Alum. Co., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
241 P. AlmEA & D. TuBNm, supra note 5, 7f 104, at 10-11.
2
5 See Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HAnv. L. REv. 281,
306 (1956) (finding support in legislative history for the antitrust "bias" against
concentration: "It is possible, as Judge Hand pointed out in Alcoa, to prefer an
economy populated by numerous individual units even at some cost in efficiency.").
26 1 P. AREumA & D. Tunman, supra note 5, 7 103, at 7; cf. f 110 at 2, 7f401.
27 1 P. ARxwA & D. TuBNEn, supra note 5, 117f
104, 110.
28 Id. 7f107.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

250

[Vol.128:244

the "pervasive priority" of populist goals is anathema to Areeda and
Turner.29 (As if anyone had argued for a "pervasive priority," rather
than a sensible synthesis of multiple goals!) They protest only
that pursuit of populism through antitrust is often "futile" 30 and
involves "unacceptable burdens on the courts," namely the need to
"'weigh the interests of the efficient firms, and the consumers they
represent, against those of the inefficient or unneeded firms and
the populist goals for which they are the alleged proxies." 31 But
Areeda and Turner cannot have it both ways. The "moderate"
thesis that purports to take account of noneconomic goals while
rejecting only their "pervasive priority" will not stand with the
assertions that courts are institutionally incapable of dealing with
non-efficiency issues. Courts certainly will be even farther at sea
when asked to integrate these imponderables with equally imponderable considerations of "efficiency," economies of scale, and optimal
allocation of resources. It becomes perfectly clear that, in the end,
"populism" is rejected by Areeda and Turner without need for
balancing; the caption of paragraph 112 announces: "Populist Goals
Inappropriate as Antitrust Standards even if no Conflict with
Efficiency." 32
I attribute the affinity of some fine legal minds for the imponderables of economics to the fact that economists talk the language of numbers and depict their models, however remote from
the real world, in graphs whose alluring curves intersect with gratifying precision. The aversion to the incommensurable reaches its
peak in Areeda's and Turner's proposition, astounding for lawyers,
that "[a]s a goal of antitrust policy, 'fairness' is a vagrant claim
applied to any value that one happens to favor." 33 They are, of
course, perfectly right in pointing out that interest groups have
different views of what is fair and have sometimes successfully lobbied, in the name of fairness, for special protections and subsidies
inconsistent with competition and the interests of consumers. But
if imprecision and the possibility of perversion were fatal defects,
the due process clause would long ago have been repealed, and the
constitutional attack upon the Sherman Act for vagueness would
291d.

ff 111a.

sold. flillb.
31 Id. ff l11c, at 27.
32 Id. f 112. Excellent material on the controversy over antitrust goals will be
found in Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics, 127 U. PA. L. Rrv. 918
(1979); The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 CoLJm. L. Rv. 363

(1965).

33

1 P. AREEDA & D. TUN'ER, supra note 5,

If109a, at 21.
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not have failed in Nash v. United States.34 It would have been better for Areeda and Turner to accept fairness as an ingredient of
antitrust calculations than to proscribe it as a goal of the antitrust
laws. 5 Indeed, fairness is so deeply ingrained in the antitrust
tradition, from the common law background through the protests
against Rockefeller predation in the oil industry, 36 that "choosing
the economic goals"

87

to the exclusion of fairness assumes the

38
proportions of radical historical revisionism.
Needless to say, the perils and frailties of economics are not
ignored by our two experienced and thoughtful authors. Paragraph
113 deals with "Limitations on the Achievement of Antitrust Economic Objectives," and acknowledges that "economic science has
gaps in theory and problems with empirical verification. Thus, it
is not capable of telling us with confidence whether or when a particular arrangement or market situation will contribute to economic
welfare or detract from it." 39 The authors promise an exploration
of these "difficulties" in Chapter 4, "The Economic Basis for Antitrust Policy." Alas, the promise is not fulfilled. This chapter is a
remarkable and useful recapitulation of the economics of competition, monopoly, and oligopoly, with particular regard to "allocative efficiency" and "operating efficiency." 40 Economies of scale,
entry barriers, "second best" considerations, and much more that
will be helpful to judge and advocate are set forth in jargon-free
prose, with occasional references to diversities of opinion from representatives of various quarters of the economic compass, including
Bain, Scherer, and Posner. But for a thorough expression of the
necessary caution in basing antitrust on the science of economics,
one must turn to Sullivan's Handbook: "The economics of antitrust
is, perhaps, less a science than an applied art." 41

II. SUivAN's HUMANISM

Sullivan is by no means a nihilist with respect to economics.
On the contrary, he starts his book with a splendid and subtle introduction devoted almost entirely to the relation between antitrust
4 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
35 1 P. A.EEDA & D. TxNF, supra note 5, 1 109, at 21.
36 See H. THoEmiL, TnE FxoitL ANrmusT PouicY 67-68, 91-96 (1955).

37 1 P. AREDrA & D. TuRmE, supra note 5, ff 109, at 21.
3
8 Cf. R. Bonx, THE AmrimusT PAunYnox: A PoLicy AT WARi
(1978).
39 1 P. AREEDA & D. TumNsa,
40

w'I- ITSELF

supra note 5, 11109, at 21.

See especially 2 P. A.REEA & D. Tu-am, supra note 5, ff1f 402b-403c.
4
1 L. SuLI.VAw, supra note 6, § 1, at 9.
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law and economics. Along with Appendix A, Chapter 1 pays its due
to the problems of scarcity, demand, supply, profit-maximization,
marginal costs and revenues, and equilibrium prices. And the
conclusion? That the Harvard and Chicago schools of economics
err in their mutual acceptance of efficient allocation of resources as
the sole, or even major, goal of antitrust.42 The economic model,
says Sullivan,
has an enormous appeal to anyone interested in antitrust
policy. It holds up the image of a comprehensive, rational
way to predict the allocation effects of alternative ways in
which markets are structured and alternative ways traders
in the market may conduct themselves. But, like a mirage,
the image fades upon a close approach to it. The gravest
difficulty is that the standard demonstration about the
allocative efficiency of a competitive market over a monopolized one is subject to stringent theoretical conditions
Theorizwhich are never fulfilled in the real world ....
ing has not yet reached a degree of comprehension which
warrants trying to put it to use in formulating policies
48

. . . °4

Sullivan notes also the flux of economic opinion, including the embarrassing fact that orthodox economic opinion at time of adoption
44
of the Sherman Act doubted the significance of private monopoly.
For Sullivan, a more realistic economic goal for antitrust is to
keep prices of particular products in line with input costs, and
profits proportional to risk.45 He unabashedly orients antitrust to
46
"justice" and social concerns, as well as to macroeconomic welfare.
"Populism" for Sullivan is not a term of reproach, but the very
foundation of antitrust 4 7 Economics is indeed useful to the antitrust lawyer, useful for "techniques which the law may use as tools
in pursuit of its own objectives." 48 But "economics does not comprehend enough and law ... cannot adequately deal with all that
economics does comprehend." 49 Law must respond to other values
Id. § 1, at 2-6.
Id. § 1, at 3, 5.
4AId. §1, at 9.
42

43

45 Id.§ 1, at 5. Sullivan offers this narrower sense of "allocative efficiency" in
place of the broad, comparative, welfare sense espoused by the Chicago and Harvard
schools.
46 Id.
47 Id. § 2, at 11.
48 Id. § 1, at 9 (emphasis added).

49 Id. § 2, at 10.
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and, especially, must transform economic insights into workable
generalizations and a coherent system with which alone legal institutions can function. 0 Those pages of Sullivan dealing with the
nature of law should be required reading in any course on jurisprudence. They are provocative and illuminating; the following
sample gives the flavor:
[L]egal analysis, if it can be likened to a social science at
all, is more humanistic both in its aspirations and its methodology. It is closer, surely, to history, perhaps even to
literature, than it is to economics. In ideal form law
presupposes few easily predictable sequences in human
affairs, and aims at no form of perfection. Rather it seeks
to understand recurrent human situations in terms of motivations commonly perceived and to judge specific human
actions which occur in such situations with reference to a
cultural experience, with reference to a tradition.5 1
III. PREDATORY PRICING

Nothing better illustrates the divergence of outlook between
Areeda and Turner and Sullivan than their treatments of predatory
pricing. As is well known, Areeda and Turner sponsor the rule
that price-cutting should never be impugned as predatory behavior
unless the resulting price is below reasonably anticipated short-run
marginal costs. 52 In other words, if the price-cutter expects to break
even on his cut-price sales after disregarding his overhead, he is in
the clear. This defense will prevail over any showing that his
explicit purpose was to annihilate a smaller competitor or to intimidate rivals into conforming to price or other marketing norms.
In contrast, Sullivan defines "predatory practices" to include
any behavior "that has the purpose and effect of advancing the
actor's competitive position, not by improving the actor's market
performance, but by threatening to injure or injuring actual or potential competitors, so as to drive or keep them out of the market, or
force them to compete less effectively." 53 "Predatory intent" is
crucial: "price reduction or predatory expenditure is calculated to
impose losses on other firms, not to garner gains for itself"; "[losses
Gold. §2, at 12.
51 Id. § 2, at 11-12.
523 P. AuEEDA & D. TuRNE , supra note 5,

1111
710-711d,

especially g711d,

at 153-54. As a concession to the difficulties in determining marginal costs, the
authors accept average variable costs as a surrogate for marginal costs. Id.
53 L. SuLtVAw, supra note 6, § 43, at 108.
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or foregone profits] are accepted by the predator as the cost of freeing itself for the future from the competition it now faces." 54 In
some situations, there will be difficulties in distinguishing between
vigorous competition and predation; data on the relation of price
to marginal cost will certainly be useful in that inquiry. But the
proper roles of law and economics must be recalled:
If we are going to rely on judges and jurors to discover
predatory business conduct we cannot deprive them'of all
traces of the juices in the situation. A firm which seeks
to drive out or exclude rivals by selling at unremunerative
prices will leave human traces; the very concept is one of a
human animus bent, if you please, upon a course of conduct socially disapproved. If there is one task that judges
and juries, informed through the adversary system, may
really be good at, it is identifying the pernicious in human
affairs. To contend that the conventional formulation
which looks, in a sense, for evil, ought to be amended to
one which looks solely to an effect validated by economic
studies is to assume too much about the precision of
applied economics and to assume too little about the value
of more humanistic modes of inquiry. 55
Areeda and Turner are at their best and worst in arguing for
maximum pricing freedom for powerful firms. Given their assumptions (based on economic modeling, not empirical data) of rational
profit maximization by monopolistic sellers, of the welfare benefits
to be derived from permitting full utilization of a major firm's
"sexcess capacity," of potential competition ready to enter the market
the moment the price-cutting monopolist moves to recoup the profits
temporarily foregone, their position seems impregnable. It is
tightly reasoned, comprehensive, and even eloquent. Small wonder
that a number of courts have accepted this seemingly simple guide
through, or bypass around, the complexities of good and evil.5 6
The authors make it appear obvious that price, that great allocator
of resources, should be allowed to dip low enough to squeeze excess
capacity out of the supply side of the market and to discourage additional investment in excess capacity. Moreover, the argument pro54 Id. § 43, at 11I (footnotes omitted).

55 Id. § 43, at 110. See also Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. 11v. 1214
(1977); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA.
L. REv. 1076 (1979).

56 See notes 69 & 72 infra.
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ceeds, no efficient rival of equal "staying power" 57 (meaning one
just as powerful financially) would be forced out of the market.
Marginal-cost pricing
may ....
to be sure, bankrupt an equally efficient small
rival . . . and that may in turn lead to a higher price
than would otherwise exist (though the price may be no
higher than the assuredly lawful full-cost price). But
against any such loss must be set any social gain from
transferring the rival's assets to more productive use.58
It would be hard to devise a formula more conducive to concentration of production in oligopolists of equal "staying power."
Under such a rule of law, the oligopolists would either eliminate
the smaller units or teach them convincingly the merits of never
challenging price norms of market leaders. It is difficult also to
imagine a more unrealistic hypothesis than the conversion of smallbusiness assets "to more productive use" following bankruptcy
precipitated by selective price-cutting by a giant competitor avowedly pursuing an exclusionary policy. In contrast to the authors'
rigor in requiring sacrifice of the small enterprise for the sake of
public gain from a mythically optimal allocation of resources is
their solicitude for the safety of powerful firms who (unwittingly,
of course, because they are profit maximizers) cut their prices below
marginal costs, producing both misallocation of resources and unjustified casualties among competitors. There must be, they say,
a defense of "legitimate" marginal-cost pricing for the powerful
firm unless it "lacked reasonable cause to believe that the case was
one in which marginal-cost pricing was permissible." 59 This is, in
practical effect, a blank check for the benefit of oligopoly: the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff; marginal costs and average
variable costs, however clear in concept, are enormously difficult to
calculate in practice, providing a wide range of plausible solutions;
and the would-be predatory pricer has only to garnish his files with
a cost-justifying memorandum to free himself to embark upon a
"price war," no matter how explicit his intent to drive out the
target competitor. For-and it cannot be over-emphasized-Areeda
and Turner are determined to make intent irrelevant,60 in this
51

3 P. AmRDA & D. TURNER, supra note
f[715a, at 165.

5, 1f715, at

164.

58 Id.

59 Id.111715a, at 167, & 717d.
60 But see id. ff 715a, at 168 n.7: "We conclude that disciplinary price cuts to
levels above marginal cost should be disregarded-at least in the absence of clear
direct evidence of disciplinary intent."
(Emphasis in original.)
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respect positioning themselves to the right of even Posner of the
Chicago school.61
Finally, this house of cards must collapse when one considers
Areeda's and Turner's rejection of the concept of "predatory investment." 62 A powerful firm should be free, they argue, to create
"excess capacity" without inquiry either into whether its purpose
is to exclude competition 63 or into its expectable marginal costs.
Restraints on such counter-economic activity are deemed unadministrable: "legitimate cases of excess capacity" cannot by any
workable rule be distinguished from predatory investment.64 They
are very likely right about that, once intent has been barred from
consideration.65

But why bar intent? Sullivan, of course, would not bar intent,
would not make it an absolute defense that, in predatory-pricing
cases, marginal costs or average variable costs were covered:
The fact that predatory activity is costly to the predator
and that there is only an uncertain prospect of adequate
supra-competitive returns after others are excluded surely
must reduce the frequency of predatory forays. It hardly
follows that they never occur or can be safely ignored.
Man's capacity for destructive conduct has never been
totally inhibited merely because he stands himself in the
target area along with his would-be victim. The best
course, moreover, is to leave the avenues of inquiry as
open as may be. Objective data, such as that stressed by
Areeda and Turner, could then be used either to attack
or defend, but so also could any other evidence indicative
of predatory intent. . . . Direct evidence of predatory
intent will usually be difficult to uncover.
Yet there are hallmarks. Predatory conduct will usually
display two identifying characteristics. First, there will be
something odd, something jarring or unnatural seeming
61 Id.ff 715b, at 168 n.7.
Id. 1f718.
102
63 Contrast Judge Hand's position in the Alcoa case. See text accompanying
notes 12-24 supra.
64 3 P. AnEEDA & D. TumRNx,

supra note 5, ff 718b, at 181. But courts have in
fact been able to distinguish predatory from other investment. See Photovest Corp.
v. Fotomat Corp., ANTrUST & T.ADE RE. Rn P. (BNA) (Oct. 4, 1979) (Seventh
Circuit upheld as violation of Sherman Act the "saturation" of competitor's market
with competing outlets for monopolistic purposes).

65 Areeda and Turner summarily reject any intent-based test: "Even a narrow
prohibition, requiring clear proof of a deliberate choice to invest despite the
anticipation of losses, would subject innocent firms to the threat of baseless but
costly litigation.

The slight possibility of predation does not outweigh the potential

abuse of a rule against predatory investment. Id. ff 718b, at 181.
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about it. It will not strike the informed observer as
normal business conduct, as honestly industrial. Second,
it will be aimed at a target, at an identifiable competitor
or potential competitor, or an identifiable group of them. 68
Sullivan sees the difficulties of administration as manageable,6 7 and
cites many cases in which the courts have in fact drawn the line
between predatory behavior and aggressive competition with normal
business methods and objectives. 68 Needless to say, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Telex Corp. v. I.B.M.,69 embraced by Areeda and
Turner,70 is disapproved by Sullivan for its lax approach to what he
labels exclusionary price discrimination. 71 Even the Tenth Circuit
has made clear that it is not committed to a "solely cost-based test," 72
and the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures has rejected the Areeda and Turner position.7"

IV. PiucE

DISCRIMINATION

Areeda and Turner apparently regard the Robinson-Patman
Anti-Discrimination Act 74 as so alien to antitrust goals and optimal
resource allocation that they virtually ignore it in their treatise,7
although they do casually deal the coup de grdce to any ban on
66

L. SurmrvAN, supra note 6, § 43, at 110-113.

67 Id. § 47c, at 121.
68 Id. § 44.
69 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975).
70 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 5, 11714d, at 164 n.12.
71 L. SuLvAN, supra note 6, § 47, at 124-25.
72

See Pac. Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th
Cir. 1977) (in reversing a treble damage judgment where prices did not go below
average variable costs, court undertook investigation, but could find no other
indication of anticompetitive purpose). See also California Computer Products,
Inc. v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., TRADE RE-. BR,. (CCH) F762,713 (9th Cir.,

June 21, 1979) ("We recognize that refinement of the marginal or average variable
cost test will be necessary . . . . [We do not foreclose the possibility that a
monopolist who reduces prices to some point above marginal or average variable
costs might still be held to have engaged in a predatory act because of other aspects
of its conduct.")
73
NATIONAL ComMIssioN FOR THE REviEw or ANTMRUsT LAws ArN PaocEnuRms, RPoRT To THE PnRsmzNT AND THE ATroa= GENERAL 41 (1979). See
also Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YAIE LJ.
284 (1977) and subsequent exchange, Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory
Pricing, 87 YALE LJ. 1337 (1978), and Williamson, A Preliminary Response, 87
YALE LJ. 1353 (1978).
74 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 13(b), 21(a) (1976).

75 1 P. AnEEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 5, 7 100, at 3.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

258

[Vol. 128:244

selective price-cutting.7 6 Sullivan meanwhile devotes an entire
chapter to the price-discrimination law. 7 Although the chapter is
less dismissive than Areeda's and Turner's treatment, it displays
on the whole a distaste for the Act on economic-allocation grounds,
with less than Sullivan's usual deference to justice and fairness as
ingredients of the antitrust cocktail. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental
Baking Co.,78 is condemned with a vigor not exceeded by Areeda
and Turner.7 9 But then not even this reviewer supports the myopic
vision of competition that pervades the majority opinion in that
case. The result reached in Utah Pie, affirming a jury verdict
finding price discrimination, might be justified as a vindication,
against intrusive reappraisals by courts of appeal, of jury verdicts
based on equivocal evidence. A more plausible holding might have
been, however, that Utah Pie Co. had suffered no injury "by reason
of" the alleged price-discriminations, but rather, had been harmed
only by involvement in a competitive struggle.8 0 In any event, an
aberrational decision, finding anticompetitive price discrimination
where there existed merely sharp competition, is far more tolerable
than an aberrational legal rule of non-liability that would immunize defendants not only in the equivocal competitive situation
described in Utah Pie, but even in outrageous cases of planned
extirpation of a competitor. Unfortunately, Areeda and Turner
too often rely on the possibility of abusive suits to justify an expansive rule of non-liability."' That technique, so clearly apt for justifying repeal of the Sherman Act itself, calls for a much more
precise balance of trade-offs than Areeda and Turner provide.
76

3 P.

AREmA

& D. TuiRNm,

supra note 5, If720.

77 L. Suirx.ivA, supra note 6, Cb. 8, §§ 217-31.
78386 U.S. 685 (1967).
79 L. SULLVAN, supra note 6, § 221, at 687; 3 P. Ar.EEDA & D. TumRNE, supra
note 5, If720c.
80 Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)
(bowling-center operators' loss of profits due to acquisition of failing bowling centers

by bowling-equipment manufacturer not type of injury antitrust laws designed to
prevent); American Oil Co. v. FTC, 325 F.2d 101 (7th Cir. 1963) (temporary
minimal impact on competition not type of substantial injury necessary to establish
violation of Robinson-Patman Act).

81 See 3 P. AEEA & D. TuRNEa, supra note 5, If715b2, at 169 (price even
below marginal cost approved if not below average cost; although "not justifiable
'on principle,"' this defense legitimate because "more unwarranted than wellfounded suits"); id. If718b (predatory investment as, for example, expansion of
facilities for express purpose of preempting potential rivals, not actionable because
monopolist "probably has innocent explanations." "Even a narrow prohibition,
requiring clear proof of a deliberate choice to invest despite the anticipation of

losses, would subject innocent firms to the threat of baseless but costly litigation."
Id. V 718b, at 181.).
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Areeda and Turner, as well as Sullivan, fail to consider adequately the rich legal history of predatory pricing and price discrimination in transportation and other regulated industries.82
That history demonstrates that Congress's concern with selective
price-cutting has expressed its concept of justice rather than a particular economic theory of allocation of resources. Sections 2 and
3 of the Interstate Commerce Act 3 and section 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act 84 denominate the offense as "unjust discrimination," not "uneconomic discrimination." A rule of per se illegality
is applicable in many instances, as, for example, under section 2 of
the Interstate Commerce Act, 5 prohibiting different charges to
shippers for like and contemporaneous service with respect to any
class of traffic. Complainant need not prove that the discrimination
adversely affected competition, and it is no defense that the carrier
discriminated to meet a competitive offer, or to fill empty cars.86
A hypothetical case will demonstrate the irrelevance of an "excess
resources" justification for unjust discrimination. Suppose that a
railroad proposed to meet passenger-car competition and to fill its
empty seats by granting a fifty-percent discount to ticket buyers who
owned automobiles. It evokes a "sense of injustice" 87 to contemplate two passengers making the same trip at the same time, with
one paying half fare solely because he can afford to own a car and
pay OPEC prices for fuel, and so has an alternative means of
transportation. We may be sure that any bill to legalize such a
practice would never emerge from committee, even though environmental considerations and the desirability of full utilization of
existing resources could be cited in its favor. Not even competitive necessity is accepted as a justification for discrimination between
persons in rail-freight rates.88 In maritime commerce, the prohibition of "fighting ships" and other "unjustly discriminatory or un82
The space limitations of a singe-volume hornbook imposed hard choices on
Sullivan; he still has managed, however, to make more use of regulatory analogies
than have Areeda and Turner. See, e.g., L. SULLivAN, rsupra note 6, § 48.

8349

U.S.C. §§2, 3(2) (1976).

8449 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1976).
8549 U.S.C. §2 (1976).

s6Wight v. United States, 167 U.S. 512 (1897).
87The phrase is taken from E. CAN, TBE SENsE op INjUSTICE (1949).
88Wight v. United States, 167 U.S. 512 (1897). Needless to say, the principle
has often been compromised with respect to categories of discrimination as to which
Congress has given an administrative agency the discretion to favor specified classes
,of freight or passengers.
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fair" practices, whereby the powerful may undermine competing
carriers of lesser "staying power," has been in effect for generations.8 9
In the same tradition is section 2 of the Clayton Act, amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act to ban discrimination not only upon
proof of adverse effect on competition generally, but also when the
proof goes no further than to show adverse effect upon a competitor of the discriminator or his favored customers. That position parallels the decision in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc.,90 that a concerted boycott of a discount distributor "is not to be
tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the
economy." 91 Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Klor's recognizes, as does the Robinson-Patman Act, that elimination of one
entrepreneur, pursuant to an exclusionary policy, is an intimidating
message to all other potential entrants or maverick rivals.
By invoking the jurisprudence of railroad-rate discrimination,
I do not mean to suggest that price discrimination presents the
same problem in the competitive and regulated sectors of business.
It does not. The principles of justice familiar in the regulated industries must, however, be adapted for use in the unregulated sectors
when effective competition breaks down, limiting the alternatives
open to the disfavored customer. In the regulated sector, natural
and artificial monopoly restrict the customer's ability to choose
among suppliers. As a result, the disadvantaged customer must
be protected against arbitrary handicapping by his supplier. In
the unregulated competitive sector, the customer is, ideally, protected against such abuse by the ability to shift to another supplier.
But on closer examination the contrast between the sectors fades.
A considerable degree of inter- and intramodal competition survives in the regulated sector to provide customer alternatives. On
the other hand, the notable "imperfections" in today's competitive
markets often deprive a distributor or other customer of any substantial power to shift suppliers. Oligopolies proffer illusory
choices. 92 "Shared monopolies" preempt dealer shelf-space by an
extraordinary volume of advertising and parallel marketing prac8

9
Section 14b of the Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. § 813a (1976).
Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
90 359 U.S. 207 (1959).

See

91 Id. 213.
9
2 See A. HiscEwAN,Exrr, VoicE, AwD LOYALTY 26-28 (1970), describing the

swap by Ford and General Motors of their dissatisfied customers. Consider also the
decades, before penetration by European producers, during which the American
automobile industry denied users the small-car alternative.
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tices. Few grocers can bypass Procter & Gamble, General Foods, or
Kellogg's cereals. 93 If, then, constricted alternatives for the customer call for extra safeguards of fair treatment, those principles of
justice developed in the regulated sector will be useful. An approach based on these principles would focus on the enforcement of
Robinson-Patman standards against those leading firms whose advertising or marketing policies have substantially narrowed the
distributor's range of alternatives.
V.

STRUCTURALISM AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE

Given their generally conservative position, it may be surprising to some that Areeda and Turner espouse the controversial
concept of "no-fault" monopoly. They favor creation of a civil
remedy against "mere monopoly," that is, monopoly obtained or
maintained without predatory conduct, provided that it is "persistent" and not demonstrably attributable to economies of scale,

indivisibility of resources, patents, or other government license. 4
They testified in favor of this civil remedy before the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, which,
less daring, could bring itself only to recommend that Congress
study the proposal. 95 In a most impressive analysis, Areeda and
Turner demonstrate that, in passing the Sherman Act, Congress
was concerned about monopoly however obtained and that monopoly is not necessarily self-correcting even if the monopolist refrains from predatory methods. Plausible objections to "no-fault"
are meticulously examined: "unfairness," "futility," the remedies
problem.0 6 Alternatives, such as Judge Wyzanski's "presumption"
of illegality, 97 are judiciously appraised.
This essay is a triumph of structuralist logic. Structuralist
economists are preoccupied with the presence or absence of firms in
numbers sufficient to produce workable competition and lay great
stress on entry barriers. There is little room for "subjective" factors like exclusionary intent, since idiosyncratic evil inclination
93

See

Kellogg Co. [1970-73

Transfer Binder]

TADE RE;(.

REP.

(CCH)

19,898 (FTC complaint charging four largest manufacturers of ready-to-eat
cereals with thirty-year monopoly of industry through control of shelf space; unfair
advertising and product promotion; artificial differentiation of products; proliferation
of brands and trademark advertising; and acquisition of competitors).
614-24.
943 P. AR.EDA & D. TURNER, supra note 5, 1111
95

NATiONAL ComeIssIoN FOR TE BEVw OF ANTITRUST LAWs
EDtURES, REPORT TO THE PRESDENT AND THE ATtoRNEY GENEnAL 45-49

96 3 P. ArEEDA & D. TuRNEE, supra note 5, 11620, 621, 623a.
971Id. gf
624c.

AND

Pao-
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is as nothing compared to the omnipresent gravity-like force of
profit maximization. According to other economists who emphasize
98
management strategies, game theory, and inter-temporal dynamics
rather than snapshot concentration ratios, structural economics is an
insufficient basis upon which to construct an anti-monopoly policy.
But no one has been more influential than Donald Turner in enthroning structuralism in academia and antitrust administration in
the past generation. Kaysen's and Turner's Antitrust Policy9
with its four-firm, eight-firm, and twenty-firm concentration ratios,
swept all before it. It was Turner, as Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division, who promulgated the Department
of Justice Merger Guidelines 100 which lean so heavily on concentration ratios and even reject efficiency defenses.10 1
I stress Areeda's and Turner's commitment to structuralism
not to denigrate the great usefulness of this approach, despite its
intuitive foundation and statistical vulnerability, 10 2 but to stress
that they were driven to no-fault monopoly by the logic of their
structural stance. With a premise focusing on high levels of market
concentration and its tendency toward profit maximization, and
excluding subjective factors such as intent, they could conclude
9

8 See INDUSTmAL CONCENTRATION: TnE NEw LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H.
Mann, & J. Weston eds. 1974); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act:
A Comment, 89 HAav. L. REv. 869 (1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A
Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977).

99 C. KIYsEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY (1959).
1001 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 14510 (May 30, 1968).
101 Id.

1f4510, Nos. 5, 6, 10.

Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the Department will not accept
as a justification for an acquisition normally subject to challenge under its
horizontal merger standards the claim that the merger will produce
economies (i.e., improvements in efficiency) because, among other reasons,
(i) the Department's adherence to the standards will usually result in no
challenge being made to mergers of the kind most likely to involve companies operating significantly below the size necessary to achieve significant economies of scale; (ii) where substantial economies are potentially
available to a firm, they can normally be realized through internal expansion; and (iii) there usually are severe difficulties in accurately establishing the existence and magnitude of economies claimed for a merger.
Id. 14510, No. 10; cf. f1114518(c), 4519(c).
102 If not intuitive, Kaysen and Turner were distinctly overdrawing on what
might be called "clinical impressions," when they opined that concentration of as
little as one-third of industry sales in eight large sellers was prima facie excessive
because "in the majority of markets with which we are familiar, a smaller number
of firms with larger shares of the market [makes] it likely that they will recognize
the interaction of their own behavior and their rivals' response in determining the
values of the market variables." C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, ANTrrnUsT POLICY 27
(1959). For criticism of the statistical underpinnings of structuralism, see B. Boc,
CONCENTRATION, OLIGOPOLY AND PRoFrr (1972).
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only that relief against "mere monopoly" was justified. On the
other hand, this logic entailed for them an unbearable cost in terms
of potential loss of allocative efficiency. Accordingly, they have
emasculated their no-fault proposal by providing a defense of
"'economies of scale." 103 This defense is to be available whether or
not the scale economies are passed on in the form of lower prices
to customers.10 It is favored without any examination of the tradeoff between putative scale economies of the dominant firm and two
classes of gains likely to be derived from a less centralized industrial
structure: (i) the energizing effects of rivalry, and (ii) the ability of
second and third firms to achieve most if not all of the available
scale economies as long as they are not preempted by an overwhelming number one. Finally, the defense is approved with no regard
to a consideration that the authors regularly treat as decisive: the
administrative difficulties of a rule of law that requires a court to
appraise costs and efficiencies, especially of hypothetical alternatives.
Scale economies present a constantly shifting benchmark in a
dynamic society. A single technological advance can radically alter
the picture if the new technology can be efficiently used on a much
smaller scale than the old; witness the introduction of the oxygen
process for producing steel, and shifts of relative advantage in the
technology of power production versus power transmission. Even
if it were possible to determine, as of a given date (trial? commencement of suit? accrual of cause of action?), the point at which scale
economies peter out, and the extent to which they would be
sacrificed, in light of countervailing gains, in a more competitive
industrial structure, enormous and uncongenial problems would
remain for the courts. It would be necessary, for example, to delimit the range of activities implicated in the identified economies
of scale within a giant firm. Economies of scale which might characterize petroleum exploration in risky seas or countries do not also
warrant unified control of multi-plant refining operations or marketforeclosing distribution systems. The desirability of an integrated
electric-power or communications system only makes it more important that related manufacturing operations be pruned away
from the "natural monopoly." Such responsibilities may be unavoidable in policing the "regulated industries," but they are a forbidding prospect in any proposal to justify unregulated giantism
on the basis of so slippery a concept as scale economies.
103 3

P. AF-A & D. TuamE,

104 Id. ff 621a, at 50.

supra note 5, ff 621a, at 49-50.
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It is quite indefensible for Areeda and Turner to characterize
an effective program to break up the colossi of industry as "enforced
small-scale production" and "mandated inefficiency." No one has
proposed "small-scale production." 105 Posing the alternative as if it
were industrial organization along Maoist "cottage industry" lines
is even less helpful to rational discourse than the comparable attack
on "populism." The positive correlation between size and productive efficiency, assumed here sub silentio, is belied by numerous
studies, 1°
c by financial catastrophies such as that of Penn Central,
and by the straits of General Dynamics, Lockheed, and Chrysler.
Finally, it is worth noting that the authors themselves take a much
more moderate position on scale economies when they review the
economic literature in paragraph 408:
Aggregate scale economies do not explain the levels of concentration actually existing in American markets. The
actual size of leading firms often seems far greater than
needed for efficiency. 10 7
It is almost as if the contrasting passages were written by different
members of the author team.
One more illustration of Areeda's and Turner's centrist tendency to adopt a pro-antitrust principle and to emasculate it in practice is provided by their position on vertical integration. Unlike
the "Chicago" economists, Areeda and Turner admit that a vertical
merger has an anticompetitive potential where it forecloses competitors from a significant market. But they defend vertical integration by pointing to "production flexibility," 108 the doctrine
that a producer locked out of one market has not been significantly
injured if he can readily turn to production of some other product
for which unconstrained buyers can be found. The five-to-four
decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Columbia Steel
Co.,10 9 countenanced consideration of production flexibility when
105 See text accompanying notes 9 & 10 supra.
106J. B w, BAmERRs TO NEw COMPETIION (1956); J. BLAm, ECONOMIC
CONCENTRATION (1972); F. ScHERER, INDusmx t
MARET STmucTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1970); TEmpoRARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC CoM TrrrEE,
RErATrvE EFFICIENCY OF LARGE, MEDIUMSIZED, AND SMALL BusINEss, Mono. No. 13
(1941); Adams & Dirlam, Big Steel, Invention, and Innovation, 80 Q.J. EcoN. 167
(1966); Rice, Consolidated Rail Corporation: Phoenix or Albatross?, 42 I.C.C.
PRAcr. J. 533 (1975) (demonstrating rise in unit costs of merged carriers). That
the results of these studies have been rejected by some is no justification for
question-begging assumptions.
107 2 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNEI, supra note 5, ff 408, at 298.
lo8 Id. fff 527c, 536.
-109334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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appraising mergers under the Sherman Act. The decision was
widely criticized and soon overruled in effect by the Cellar-Kefauver
Anti-Merger Act of 1950; 110 but Areeda and Turner call the decision "clearly correct." 1" Meanwhile, District Judge Weinfeld's
finding on the record in the Bethlehem Steel case, 112 that "continuing relationships between buyers and sellers in the steel industry
make [flexible production] shifts unlikely," 113 is declared "implausible." 114 One cannot help noting the correspondence between
Areeda's and Turner's position on production flexibility and their
view on predatory pricing. That view, criticized above, tolerates
bankruptcy of smaller firms by giant competitors pricing at marginal
costs in order to utilize their "excess capacity," because small-firm
assets will then be transferred "to more productive use." 115
One of the most thunderously unpersuasive dicta in the Areeda
and Turner treatise is the assertion that "Sherman and Clayton
Act Standards Coalesce." 116 One can, of course, point to an occasional decision in which Sherman is given nearly the bite of Clayton. Indeed, as to practices found per se illegal under Sherman,
Sherman bites harder; one need no longer ask, as under Clayton,
whether the effect "may be" to substantially lessen competition.
But the sweeping coalescence which the authors regard as demanded
by "rationality" 117 can only be achieved by disregarding legislative
-110 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 2.1(1976).

"'2
112

P. ArEEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 5, ff 536a, at 426.
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

113 168 F. Supp. 576, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), quoted in 2 P. ANEanA & D.
supra note 5, ff 536b, at 427.
114 2 P. AtEEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 5, f1536b, at 427.

TURNER,

As subsequent

events demonstrated, the principal implausibility in the Bethlehem case was the
defendants' contention that Bethlehem's acquisition of Youngstown Steel was the
only way to expand steel-producing capacity in the mid-continent area.
Neither Bethlehem nor Youngstown, alone, will be able to provide the
expansion that is envisioned as a result of the merger ...
. [T]o build a

new integrated steel plant in the Mid-Continent Area . . .would involve
prohibitive costs per ton of new capacity

and vastly greater capital

resources than are available to Bethlehem and would delay almost indefinitely the provision of certain important new facilities.

Affidavit of A. Homer, president of Bethlehem Steel Corp., quoted in L. ScnwARTz
& J. FLYNN, ANT
USr AND REGULvATORY ALTERNATIvES 160 (5th ed. 1977). After
Judge Weinfeld's veto of the merger, both Bethlehem and Youngstown embarked

upon vast Midwest expansion.
5

Id. 160-61.

11 See text accompanying notes 57 & 58 supra.
116 2 P. ArEEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 5, f 304, at 6.

117 Id.
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history and decisions of the Supreme Court,:"" by glossing over the
critical difference between criminal statutes such as the Sherman
Act and the purely civil Clayton Act, and by a willingness to believe
that the criteria of illegality of price discrimination are "fundamentally the same" under Sherman Act § 2 and Clayton Act § 2,
as amended by the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination Act." 9
That last requirement of the "coalescence" theory should strike fear
in the hearts of thousands of corporate counsel dedicated to the
proposition that the Robinson-Patman Act is in conflict with Sherman and should be repealed. Repeal is not going to do much good,
if we accept the Areeda and Turner thesis that it's all in the Sherman
Act!
VI. CONCLUSION

To what conclusion does our discourse tend? What are the
proper uses of economics? First, it seems clear that lawyers, judges,
and legislatures should not delegate decisionmaking to economists.
Their dogmas are no better than ours. 2 0 Their counsel is divided,
and even their consensus, shifting from time to time, cannot provide
a firm basis for policy decisions. The insights of their dissidents
may be as valid as those of their professional establishment. There
is too little empirical basis for economic doctrine, too little correspondence between its models and real life, and virtually no
118

United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States

v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963)

(declining to address the Sherman

Act issue, but finding a § 7 violation); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.

294 (1962); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).

The

Philadelphia National Bank and Brawn Shoe opinions review the legislative history
establishing Congress's intent, by means of the Cellar-Kefauver Act, to put new

brakes on mergers and, in that connection, to curtail the scope of economic
investigation.

119 2 P. AEEDA & D. TuPNma, supra note 5, ff 304c, at 9.
120 First, Book Review, 52 N.Y.U. L. BEv. 947 (1977) (R.PosNa.n, ANTrUST
LAW: AN EcoNoafic PERsPEcTnVE) and Leff, Book Review, 60 U. VA. L. REv. 451
(1974) (R. POSNra, ECONoMIC ANALYsIs oF LAw), have brilliantly exposed
economic, philosophic, and legal frailties of the "Chicago" school.
many quotable passages from Leff's verdict is apt:

One of the

Richard Posner's hero is also eponymous. He is Economic Analysis.
In the book we watch him ride out into the world of law encountering one
after another almost all of the ambiguous villians of legal thought, from
the fire-spewing choo-choo dragon to the multi-headed ogre who imprisons
fair Efficiency in his castle keep for stupid and selfish reasons. In each

case Economic (I suppose we can be so familiar) brings to bear his
single-minded self, and the Evil Ones (who like most in the literature are
in reality mere chimerae of some mad or wrong-headed magician) dissolve, one after another.
Leff, supra at 452.
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possibility of confirmation by experiment. Its record on predictions is abysmal. The unworldliness of this discipline is manifested in its avowed disinclination, or inability, to make or take
account of moral, psychological, political, or other "value" judgments; it is essentially a matter of indifference for most of the
profession what proportions of the "gross national product" consist
of cigarettes, bread, pornography, advertising, low-cost housing, or
weaponry.
But the radical skepticism expressed in the preceding paragraph is appropriate only as a preachment to those who have been
oversold. That sort of destructive barrage could be levelled at any
who espouse so dogmatically the theories of philosophy, history,
political science, anthropology, sociology, psychiatry, religion, or
other branches of learning with which we do and must seek to
illuminate the human condition. All these disciplines help, or
seem to help, us comprehend or order the infinite chaos that would
otherwise confront us. One may view them like sets of instruments
and techniques available to physicians: microscopes, stethoscopes,
X-rays, thermometers, spectrometers, electrocardiograph machines,
and sphygmographs. Similarly, physicists use an immense variety
of information-gathering devices as they supplement our primitive
senses by probing into the nature of matter and the universe. The
elusive "truth" requires a synthesis of information from all these
sources. We should be as dubious about guidance from one who
used only one or two of the available instruments, as we would be
distrusting of the description of the elephant by any one of the
seven blind men who respectively examined by touch the trunk, the
tusk, the ear, the leg, the eye, the tongue, and the back of the
legendary pachyderm. Thus our ideal legislator, judge, or lawyer
must look at the world through all available lenses, including those
of the economist.
Surely these "lenses" ought not be limited to those provided
by a single school of economists. One of the dangers of attempting
to educate lawyers and judges in economics (or psychiatry, for that
matter) is that the exposure will be to a single teacher or school, with
understatement of conflicting views. Another danger is that limited
training in an esoteric art will induce, in some of the trainees,
illusions of being an artist. 121 Moreover, gratified to be admitted
121 Compare the concern expressed in Beckwith, Judges Study Free Market
Economics (At Corporate, Foundation Expense), in Legal Times of Washington,

Feb. 5, 1979, at 1. The article deals with seminars for judges conducted by the
Law and Economics Center of the University of Miami, a well-known focus of
"Chicago Schoor' economics. One-fifth of the federal judges have already had
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to the society of the cognoscenti, judges will become too receptive
to the notion that the laity, the jury, is an obstruction to decisionmaking in "complex cases." 122 A third danger is that a person who
has taken a course or even several courses in economics as an undergraduate or in law school will, twenty years later, be spouting or
relying on obsolete, but firmly entrenched, economic dogmas. There
is still much to be said for using expert testimony or counsel's
extraction from and interpretation of current economic literature
to "educate" judges and juries in adversary proceedings. Counsel
will need advice from economists to perform this role well, just as
they need expert psychiatrists, engineers, accountants, chemists,
statisticians, or art critics in litigation involving these other mysteries.
This is not to say that there is no place in a law school curriculum for courses like economics for lawyers or law and psychiatry.
The social sciences must make their presence felt in every relevant
course on "law." But, beyond that, law as the most comprehensive
of the humanities must encourage the pursuit of particular intellectual interests of its students. One can only hope that the teachers
are not ideologues and that students find their curiosity aroused
rather than satisfied by introduction to the subject.
these two-week seminars, reporting "increased confidence" in appraising economic
testimony:
"As a result of my better understanding of the concept of marginal cost, I
have recently set aside a $15 million dollar antitrust verdict," one unnamed
U.S. District Judge wrote.
Id. 28.
122 Compare Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., (E.D. Pa., June
6, 1979), TRnnE Rc. REsP. (CCH) 1162,753 with I.L.C. Peripherals Leasing Corp.
v. I.B.M. Corp., 444 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Cal. 1978).

